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2 Some steps between attitudes 
and verdicts 
Phoebe C. Ellsworth 
The paradox of individual differences 
Most research that has attempted to predict verdict preferences on the basis 
of stable juror characteristics, such as attitudes and personality traits, has 
found that individual differences among jurors are not very useful pre-
dictors, accounting for only a small proportion of the variance in verdict 
choices. Some commentators have therefore concluded that verdicts are 
overwhelmingly accounted for by "the weight of the evidence," and that 
differences among jurors have negligible effects. But there is a paradox here: 
In most cases the weight of the evidence is insufficient to produce first-
ballot unanimity in the jury (Hans & Vidmar, 1986; Hastie, Penrod, & Penn-
ington, 1983; Kalven & Zeisel, 1966). Different jurors draw different conclu-
sions about the right verdict on the basis of exactly the same evidence. That 
these differences are consequential is indicated by the frequently replicated 
fmding that frrst ballot splits are the best-known predictor of the fmal jury 
verdict. In most laboratory studies of jury decisions, there are some juries, 
as well as jurors, that reach nonmodal verdicts. The inescapable conclusion 
is that individual differences among jurors make a difference. 
Of course these influential individual differences-need not be differences 
in character or philosophy of life. The process by which a juror comes to a 
decision about the right verdict may resemble Brownian motion more than 
it does the Galilean laws of cause and effect. First, many trials are long and 
any given juror's level of attention is likely to vary considerably. Different 
jurors will be especially attentive or especially inattentive to different bits of 
the testimony, and thus their final impressions of what was said will differ. 
Some of the factors that affect level of attention may be systematic and pre-
dictable. As an academic, for example, I will probably be especially at-
tentive to the testimony of experts, particularly other psychologists, while 
the attention of my fellow jurors may wander. When it comes to testimony 
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about the identity and trajectory of a bullet, a hunter may be a more atten-
tive witness than I. 
Other attentional differences may be more haphazard. For example, one 
juror may have a sleepless night and attend poorly to witnesses on the af-
ternoon of the following day while another witness is well rested and alert. 
Or, one juror may be inattentive while she daydreams or worries about 
whether her business is running smoothly in her absence, whereas another 
juror focuses intently on the witness at the the front of the courtroom. 
Second, haphazard, unpredictable events that occur outside the court-
room may influence jurors' judgments. For example, a juror may read a rel-
evant newspaper article, have a relevant conversation, or observe a rele-
vant incident on an evening between trial days, and see things differently 
the next day. The event could be as obviously pertinent as a conversation 
with a spouse or a friend about the proper verdict in the case, or it might be 
an apparently irrelevant event such as a chance encounter with a person 
who resembles a witness or defendant. These outside events will vary un-
systematically among jurors, and thus may be responsible for unpredictable 
individual differences in judgments that cannot be discovered at voir dire. 
But of course most lawyers and most researchers are interested in indi-
vidual differences that can be identified before trial: clearly recognizable 
characteristics of the juror that make a difference in his or her propensity to 
favor one side. This class of factors comprises systematic background char-
acteristics of the juror that he or she brings into the jury box at the start of 
the case. This class of factors can be broken down into subsets such as indi-
vidual differences in beliefs and knowledge about how the world works or 
should work; enduring personality traits, preferences, and attitudes; men-
tal capacities; past experience; and a hodgepodge of biological, social, and 
economic factors that are often labeled "demographic background." Indi-
vidual differences such as these have received the most attention from re-
searchers, scholars, and legal professionals who want to predict, under-
stand, and steer the outcomes of jury trials. There are probaf>ly several 
reasons for the high level of interest in predicting predeliberation verdict 
preferences from individual differences in attitudes, personality, and dem-
ographic characteristics. 
First, in our culture there is an almost irresistible compulsion to attribute 
differences in behavior to differences in a person's personality, attitudes, or 
background. This tendency to see causes of behavior in the person rather 
than the situation has been labeled a "fundamental error of social percep-
tion" (Ross, 1977), and it is a bias that affects professional students of behav-
ior as well as the person in the street. Indeed, some personality researchers 
have accused other researchers of being blind to the truth about the actual 
variability of personality because of our cultural habit of attributing individ-
ual differences in behavior to stable properties of the individual (Mischel, 
1968). A glance at a sample of modern trial tactics handbooks reveals that 
attorneys, like almost everyone else in our culture, incessantly generate 
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hypotheses - some common, some bizarre - about the ways that person-
ality, gender, ethnicity, and occupation affect jurors' decisions (see Hastie, 
Penrod, & Pennington, 1983: chapter 6 for examples; Appleman, 1968; Bo-
din, 1954; Rothblatt, 1966). 
Second, the practice of selecting jurors by exercising peremptory chal-
lenges in a voir dire proceeding has channeled· a great deal of energy into 
discovering ways to discriminate between prosecution (or plaintiff) and de-
fense jurors on the panel of prospective jurors (d. discussion in Hastie, 
Penrod, & Pennington, 1983, chapter 6). Indeed a small industry of jury 
selection experts has evolved that provides advice to attorneys about what 
to ask during voir dire (Bonora & Kraus, 1979; Schulman, Shaver, Colman, 
Emrich, & Christie, 1973). Most of these experts are social scientists who 
rely on survey methods and clinical intuition to pick jurors with the right 
personalities, attitudes, or prejudices to assist the side that has employed 
them in winning at trial. 
Third, the "classic" study in the held of research on jury decision making 
concluded that the distribution of jurors' individual verdict preferences be-
fore deliberation predicted the verdict at the end of deliberation in "nine 
out of ten juries" (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966: p. 488). The implication was that 
an account Qf_tb.e.Jnanngr.in_ whkh_predeliberation verqicts arose, with a fo-
cus on th~ reasons for 9_iff~:r:_~_I1c~samong jurors whoheard the same case, 
WOUld provide-US w-iti}the_aJ1SWer to the question of the final verdict. 
But, alas, when an intelligent person is faced with the task of choosing 
among many candidates for a small number of positions, there is a perva-
sive tendency to see evidence for individual differences where little or none 
exists. What is called "personality" is a complex product of current situa-
tion and personal history that is rarely manifested in a simple, enduring, 
cross-situational behavioral propensity. Furthermore, the scanty scientific 
evidence concerning the utility of systematic jury selection techniques does 
not suggest that these methods provide much leverage to control the ver-
dict by the side that employs them. Kalven and Zeisel's "nine out of ten'' 
rule is an exaggeration of the strength of the relationship between initial 
verdict preferences and the jury's verdict, especially so when the jury is 
faced with several verdict choices, or several counts, or any task more com-
plex than a simple guilty-innocent choice. Nonetheless, some stable indi-
vidual differences apparently do matter and this chapter is a review of the 
research on an attitudinal individual difference that does predict jurors' ver-
dicts. Discovering and analyzing an individual difference that does have 
some predictive value allows us to study the mechanisms by which the inter-
nal propensity affects the judgment of a legal case, and thus may guide our 
search for other meaningful individual difference variables in a manner that 
goes beyond the usual low-level stereotyping social scientists and lawyers 
have employed. 
Systematic scientific research on the relationships between individual 
differences in juror background and verdicts has taken three forms: analyses 
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of national surveys relating aggregate trends in jury verdicts to aggregate 
trends in public attitudes (e.g., Levine, 1983); studies of the correlations 
between jurors' characteristics and the actual trial verdicts they retrospec-
tively report (Costantini & King, 1980; Moran & Comfort, 1986); and studies 
of the correlations between juror background factors and juror verdicts in 
controlled mock-jury tasks. In a pure form this research seeks stable char-
acteristics of the individual juror that predict his or her tendency to favor 
one verdict or another at different points in time and even in different cases 
(although we usually expect to fmd a tendency that is exhibited for very 
similar cases, e.g., violent crimes against a person). 
The search for individual differences that predict verdict preferences or 
behavior in deliberation might set out inductively by frrst trying to identify 
individuals who have a stable tendency to convict or to acquit and then, 
after "convictors" and "acquitors" have been identified, to search for char-
acteristics of the jurors that discriminate between the two groups. Rarely, 
however, do we have a sufficient string of decisions by the same juror, 
except in the most abstract and cursory of case presentations, to use this 
method. In practice, research has usually proceeded in the reverse direc-
tion - starting with a hypothesis about a characteristic of the juror that will 
predict verdicts and then working "forward" to see if the predictor discrim-
inates between jurors who favor different verdicts. In fact, because research 
in this area is so nascent, the typical study begins with a guess about an 
individual difference (or differences) and looks for correlations with juror 
verdicts in a single case (cf. Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983, for are-
view and an example). 
Early studies seeking individual differences that would predict verdict 
choices sometimes adopted a global hypothesis that there were some people 
who would be conviction prone for virtually any criminal case and oth-
ers who would be acquittal prone for virtually any case, something akin to 
"hardliners" and "bleeding hearts." For the most part research has not 
found simple individual differences in juror decisions (Saks, 1976; Saks & 
Hastie, 1978; Suggs & Sales, 1978). However, a more sophisticated "inter-
actionist" perspective now guides most research and the usual expectation 
is that there will be "case X individual interactions" so that one individual 
may exhibit a tendency to convict in certain types of (similar) cases, but not 
all cases. This shift from a search for "global conviction proneness" to selec-
tive conviction proneness follows a similar development of research sophis-
tication in the area of personality and individual differences where there 
has been a shift from the search for global cross-situational individual differ-
ences to a search for "person X situation interactions" (Bern & Allen, 1974). 
In our own research we have focused on jurors' attitudes toward capital 
punishment. Individual differences in specific attitudes about legal institu-
tions seem to be one of the only clear exceptions to our general conclusion 
that there are no simple individual difference effects in legal judgments. 
(Another is the tendency for females to give harsher verdicts in rape cases, 
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cf. Hans, 1982). There is a well-established relationship between a juror's 
attitude toward capital punishment and the tendency to vote for conviction 
or acquittal. Jurors who favor the death penalty tend to favor conviction 
more than jurors who oppose the death penalty. The relationship is modest 
in strength; for example, when indexed by an r2 statistic between a scaled 
measure of attitude intensity and conviction proneness the typical value 
would be + .04, not much better than the predictive value of a major league 
baseball player's batting average on the likelihood that he will get a hit at a 
particular "at bat" (Abelson, 1985). But the relationship keeps showing up, 
appearing in a great variety of research designs across a range of real and 
artificial criminal case decisions. However, there do seem to be some in-
stances in which the relationship is attenuated or even reversed. For ex-
ample, there is some evidence that jurors who favor capital punishment 
tend to be conviction prone for major felonies but tend to be acquittal prone 
in comparison to jurors who oppose capital punishment when deciding 
driving-while-intoxicated cases. 
Our initial goal was to fi.nd out whether attitudes toward the death pen-
alty did in fact predict other proprosecution attitudes and verdict prefer-
ences in actual cases. Once the basic relationship had been established, we 
went on to explore some possible mechanisms by which general attitudes 
might affect verdicts in particular cases. 
A generic model for jury decision making 
A review of the literature on individual juror decision making suggests a 
variety of subprocesses that contribute to the fi.nal decision (see the other 
chapters in this book). Seven conceptually distinct components that con-
stitute a modal model for performance of the decision task have been sin-
gled out by Pennington and Hastie (1981). These are listed below, with no 
implication that the order presented here is necessary or even typical. 
1. The juror takes in information from trial events. Probably most of this 
information is legally relevant evidence, but extralegal information rang-
ing from nonverbal cues provided by a witness's behavior to off-the-record 
statements made by an attorney or witness would also be included in the 
category. Understanding individual variability in outcomes at this stage of 
the judgment process requires an effective theory of the factors that influ-
ence selective attention. 
2. The juror constructs a causal-sequential representation of the facts in 
the case. In Pennington's terms, the juror is attempting to construct a valid 
story of the events that occurred relevant to the criminal charges (see Penn-
ington, this book). According to Pennington and Hastie (1986) there is a 
definite relationship between the outcome of this stage of the judgment 
process and the ultimate verdict. However, as yet no one has been able to 
predict the form of evidence representation from information available 
about a juror's background or anything else. 
Some steps between attitudes and verdicts 47 
3. In the meantime, the juror attempts to evaluate the credibility of the 
information conveyed by the witnesses. This includes evaluations of the 
individual witness's demeanor, character, and motivations as well as judg-
ments of the plausibility of statements made by witnesses with reference to 
the juror's knowledge of how the world works. Undoubtedly, the factors 
that affect perceptions of credibility in other contexts apply to the court-
room as well, factors such as perceived power, competence, trustworth-
iness, and similarly to the juror (Zimbardo, Ebbesen, & Maslach, 1977), 
along with other more case-specific characteristics such as the "fit" of the 
witnesses's appearance and demeanor to his or her role in the story the 
juror is constructing. 
4. The juror is supposed to separate admissible from inadmissible evi-
dence in order to ignore inappropriate information when deciding on a 
verdict. Advice on the performance of this task is provided in the judge's 
instructions during the trial and in the final instructions concerning admis-
sibility. We know of no research on individual differences in performance 
of this subtask. The ways in which inadmissible or extralegal evidence may 
influence a juror can range from blatant intentional disregard of the judges' 
instructions to subtle alterations in the construal of the rest of the evidence 
in jurors who make a sincere effort to ignore the inadmissible evidence and 
believe that they have succeeded (Gerbasi, Zuckerman, & Reis, 1977; Ross, 
1987). 
5. The juror learns the legal categories relevant to the verdict. In crimi-
nal cases the verdict definitions are provided in the judge's instructions on 
the law. There is considerable variability across jurors in their performance 
of this subtask, but no simple, direct relationship has emerged between 
success in learning the verdict definitions and a bias to favor the prosecu-
tion or defense (Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983). 
6. The juror attempts to relate the evidence to the legal categories in 
order to select the appropriate or best-supported verdict. 
7. The juror compares his or her strength of belief in the verdict to a 
legal standard of proof, usually the beyond reasonable doubt instruction 
in a criminal case. Kerr (this book), Thomas and Hogue (1976) and others 
have shown that variations in subjective threshold to convict are predictive 
of verdicts. But, we do not know of a useful a priori predictor of variations 
in the threshold. 
Our research on individual juror decision making suggests that jurors do 
not perform these seven component tasks in a fixed temporal sequence, do 
not necessarily perform all of the tasks before deliberation begins, and do 
not perform all of the tasks with a high degree of competence. Our obser-
vations suggest that jurors concentrate on comprehending trial events, con-
structing a fact sequence, evaluating credibility, and relating the evidence 
to a legal category. However, they do not seem to spend a great deal of 
time trying to define the legal categories, evaluating the admissibility of 
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evidence they are using, or testing their fmal conclusion against a standard 
of proof. In fact, many jurors simply appear to select a sketchy stereotyped 
theme to summarize what happened (e.g., "cold-hearted killer plots re-
venge," "nice guy panics and overreacts") and then choose a verdict on the 
basis of the severity of the crime as they perceive it. 
Research on the relationship between attitudes toward capital 
punishment and juror decision making 
We chose to study attitudes toward capital punishment in part because they 
are generally strongly held and closely related to other attitudes about the 
criminal justice system (Ellsworth & Ross, 1983) and in part because they 
are legally consequential. In a trial in which the defendant faces possible 
execution, citizens who strongly oppose the death penalty are not allowed 
to serve as jurors. They are excluded from service both at the ultimate stage 
of the trial concerned with the penalty and at the earlier stage in which the 
jury decides whether or not the defendant is guilty. The empirical relation-
ship between death penalty attitudes and verdicts is legally significant be-
cause several defendants have appealed their convictions on the grounds 
that a "death-qualified jury" is more likely to convict than a standard jury 
with no one excluded on the basis of their anticapital punishment attitude 
(the most important cases include Hovey v. Superior Court, 1980; Lockhart v. 
McCree, 1986; Witherspoon v. Illinois, 1968). These defendants claim that the 
jury decision process is biased against them if there is a correlation between 
death penalty attitudes and verdicts and potential jurors are excluded from 
service on the basis of their attitudes. 
Another good reason to study individual differences in attitudes toward 
the death penalty is that there was already good evidence for the relation 
between these attitudes and verdicts. During the past thirty years social 
scientists have conducted more than a dozen studies using survey meth-
ods, posttrial interviews with actual jurors, and mock-jury simulation ex-
periments to study the attidue-verdict relationship. Every study found that 
jurors who did not oppose the death penalty were more likely to convict 
than jurors who opposed the penalty. In our view, the answer to the basic 
"prediction question'' is firmly established; attitude toward the death pen-
alty, a fairly stable individual difference, does predict jurors' verdicts in a 
wide range of criminal cases. Having replicated this relationship in our own 
research (Cowan, Thompson, & Ellsworth, 1984), we turned to the "media-
tion question" where we have tried to determine which components of the 
global juror decision process are influenced by the attitude. 
Attitudes as individual differences 
Psychologists have developed the concept of attitude to represent an inter-
nal mental state that indicates a propensity or predisposition to respond in 
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one manner or another (Campbell, 1963; McGuire, 1969, 1983). Attitudes 
can be thought of as beliefs that have three properties; they refer to a condi-
tion, object, or event in the real world; they include a prescription of evalu-
ation, goodness, or preference; and they provide implications for behavior. 
Attitudes rarely exist in isolation. Rather they come as bundles or constella-
tions of related beliefs, and a scientifically ineffable but intuitively sensible 
consistency seems to apply locally to constellations of closely related atti-
tudes. However, global and strict logical consistency do not seem to apply 
(Abelson, Aronson, McGuire, Newcomb, Rosenberg, &Tannenbaum, 1968). 
In the case of attitudes toward the death penalty, the subject of the attitude 
statement is the legal institution of punishing criminals by execution. The 
evaluative component of the attitude is usually measured as a preference: 
Is the person whose attitude is measured in favor of or opposed to the exis-
tence of the legal institution of capital punishment? The implications for 
action include social endorsement ("Would you vote for new legislation 
that would establish/repeal capital punishment?") and, most important in 
the context of juror decision making, ramifications of the belief for related 
behaviors ("As a juror, would you refuse to impose the death penalty on a 
convicted defendant in any case, no matter what the evidence was?"). 
In legal contexts the most significant implication for behavior associated 
with attitudes toward the death penalty is concerned with the possibility 
that the attitude will influence jurors' decisions in a criminal trial. The most 
direct implication is that during the penalty phase of the trial a juror who 
strongly opposed the death penalty will be unable to follow a trial judge's 
instructions to consider imposing a death penalty. The reverse extreme is 
also legally significant, and a juror who is so enthusiastic about the capital 
punishment that he or she would automatically vote for the death penalty 
whenever it is available would also be excluded from impanelment. The at-
titude might also influence a juror's behavior at the guilt-innocence phase 
of the trial. Of special legal significance is the possibility that a juror who 
strongly opposes the death penalty cannot be impartial when deciding on a 
verdict in a capital case. Even knowing that execution is only a possibility 
might incline the juror to acquit, or convict of a lesser charge. The covaria-
tion of people's attitudes toward capital punishment with other attitudes in 
conformity with some rule of psychological consistency has also been in-
vestigated. There is a degree of local consistency among beliefs related to 
the criminal justice system such that a person's attitude toward the death 
penalty is correlated with a constellation of other attitudes (Boehm, 1968; 
Jurow, 1971). Specifically, a person who opposes the death penalty is likely 
to exhibit other attitudes that are associated with an emphasis on due pro-
cess guarantees in the criminal justice system. For example, in comparison 
to people who oppose the death penalty, people who favor capital punish-
ment tend to be more concerned about high levels of violent crime, to ex-
hibit less sympathy for criminal defendants, to be more suspicious of de-
fense attorneys, and to exhibit more favorable attitudes toward prosecuting 
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attorneys and the police (Bronson, 1970; Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, 1984; Tyler 
& Weber, 1982; Vidmar & Ellsworth, 1974). It has been argued (Ellsworth 
& Ross, 1983; Tyler & Weber, 1982) that attitudes toward the death pen-
alty are an especially pure example of "symbolic attitudes" (Sears & Kinder, 
1971), emotionally based attitudes that serve to express a person's ideologi-
cal self-image - as a practical person who takes a no-nonsense approach to 
crime or as a champion of the individual against the mistakes and preju-
dices of the state. 
We view this constellation of attitudes as analogous to a set of premises 
in a logical argument that serve as the bases for inferences that are gener-
ated when a juror is asked to make a decision in a speci.ftc criminal trial. We 
believe that a juror's attitude toward the death penalty predicts his or her 
verdict because it is embedded in this constellation of relevant beliefs about 
the justice system; For example, if we consider a juror who strongly favors 
capital punishment, several beliefs in the constellation will operate to pro-
duce a guilty verdict. His positive attitude toward the prosecution side of 
the case will lead him to attend to the prosecuting attorney and to see the 
prosecution story as more plausible; similarly for police officers called as 
witnesses. His suspicion of defense attorneys will cause him to discount 
the testimony of defense witnesses, and render the defense less persuasive. 
His lack of sympathy for the defendant and his worries about the high lev-
els of crime he perceives in his society will lead him to be relatively uncon-
cerned about the possibility of a mistaken conviction, and may even lower 
his personal standard of proof to convict for any charge. Just the reverse 
pattern of biases would be expected to apply to a juror who was strongly 
opposed to capital punishment. The point is that because attitudes toward 
the criminal justice system come in a "bundle," they will operate concomit-
antly to influence several aspects of a complex decision process to produce 
a bias toward one outcome. 
The distributed character of the influence of the constellation of attitudes 
on the verdict decision will render it virtually undetectable to a subjec-
tive introspection. Legal decisions by their very nature require the decision 
maker to resolve a host of ambiguities and incompletenesses in the patch-
work of evidence presented at trial. The ultimate decision also requires the 
application of presumption of innocence and standard of proof instructions 
that are demonstrably imprecise and subject to large differences of inter-
pretation (d. Fletcher, 1968; Shapiro, 1986; Simon & Mahan, 1971). It is not 
surprising that individual jurors may feel that they have performed in a rig-
orous and rational manner, yet reach sharply divergent conclusions. In fact, 
one of the most surprising experiences for jurors in many cases is to dis-
cover, at the start of deliberation, that other jurors could disagree with them 
on a verdict that seems patently obvious (Ellsworth, 1989). 
We have examined three ways in which an attitude might affect a ver-
dict. First, we thought that a juror's attitude might influence his or her eval-
uation of witness credibility. Social psychologists have established that an 
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audience is more persuaded by a communicator toward whom they have a 
favorable attitude than by one they dislike or oppose (Hovland, Janis, & 
Kelley, 1953). Our specific hypothesis is that jurors who favor the death 
penalty will find police witnesses and prosecutors more credible and per-
suasive than will jurors who oppose the death penalty. On the other hand, 
jurors who oppose the death penalty should find defense attorneys and 
witnesses relatively more persuasive. 
Second, inferences partially based on attitudes about the criminal jus-
tice system should affect the juror's construction of a fact sequence or story 
to summarize the evidence that he or she accepts as credible. Many state-
ments by witnesses are ambiguous in their implications or may be fitted 
into an overall fact sequence in several places. There is evidence from re-
search by cognitive and social psychologists that attitudes influence the per-
ception of a complex event by influencing gap-fJ.lling inferences and the 
resolution of ambiguities in the interpretation of stimulus information. As 
a general principle ambiguous or incomplete information will tend to be in-
terpreted in a fashion that is consistent with a person's initial attitudes and 
that confirms their expectations (Chapman & Chapman, 1967; Ross, Lep-
per, & Hubbard, 1975; Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977; Vallone, Ross, & 
Lepper, 1985). Death penalty attitudes may also be correlated with the rela-
tive availability of various crime "scripts." Insofar as a juror's own script 
matches the story presented in the prosecution case, the prosecution story 
will seem "natural," plausible, and familiar. In effect, one's attitudes affect 
one's Bayesian prior probability estimates of the truth of any particular story 
presented in court. In the context of a criminal trial our hypothesis is that 
jurors who favor the death penalty, and also favor the prosecution side of 
the case, will tend to interpret ambiguous and incomplete evidence in a 
manner consistent with the prosecution theory of the case, while jurors 
who oppose the death penalty will resolve perceptual questions to fit the 
defense theory. 
Third, we thought that the ultimate step in the juror's decision, the ap-
plication of the judge's instructions on the reasonable doubt standard of 
proof, might be influenced by the juror's attitudes toward the death pen-
alty. The beyond-reasonable-doubt standard creates a decision threshold 
that varies across individuals (Simon & Mahan, 1971; U.S. v. Fatica, 1978). 
Thus, just as an attitude might influence a juror's perceptions of ambiguous 
information about an objective event, an attitude might influence a juror's 
interpretation of the subjective degree of confidence associated with the 
term "beyond reasonable doubt." The specific hypothesis we entertain is 
that those favoring the death penalty would have a lower threshold for 
conviction than those opposed to the death penalty. 
We assessed our subjects' attitudes toward the death penalty in two 
ways. First, we asked them to complete a set of questionnaire items de-
signed to assess their attitudes on a five-point scale with endpoints labeled 
"strongly opposed" and "strongly in favor" (Capital Punishment Attitude 
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Questionnaire-Form A; Jurow, 1971). Second, the subjects answered sev-
eral questions designed to determine their eligibility for inclusion on a death-
qualified jury based on legal precedents established by the Supreme Court 
(Witherspoon v. Illinois, 1968). 
Is your attitude towards the death penalty such that as a juror you would never be 
willing to impose it in any case, no matter what the evidence was, or would you 
consider voting to impose it in some cases? (A) I would be unwilling to vote to 
impose it in any case. (B) I would consider voting to impose it in some cases. 
A response of (A) meant the subject was a "Witherspoon Excludable" juror. 
Now suppose that you were a juror in the frrst part of the trial, just to decide whether 
the accused person is guilty or not guilty of the crime. The judge instructs you that 
in reaching your verdict you are only allowed to consider evidence presented in 
court, and must follow the law as he will state it to you. If the accused is found 
guilty, there will be a separate trial to decide whether or not he or she will get the 
death penalty. Which of the following expresses what you would do if you were a 
juror for the fi.rst part of the trial? (A) I would follow the judge's instructions and 
decide the question of guilt or innocence in a fair and impartial manner based on the 
evidence and the law. (B) I would not be fair and impartial in deciding the question 
of guilt or innocence knowing that if the person was convicted he or she might get 
the death penalty. 
Any subjects who answered (B) to this item were eliminated from service 
in the research because jurors who say they cannot judge guilt fairly are ex-
cluded from service at trials. Because of the legal significance of the distinc-
tion between death-qualified jurors and excludable jurors, in most analyses 
we separated our subjects into two groups according to their classification 
as death-qualified or excludable. 
Empirical research on the impact of attitudes on juror decisions 
The method we used to test our first two hypotheses concerned with credi-
bility evaluation and evidence interpretation was a simulated juror decision 
making task. We showed jury-eligible California residents a videotaped frag-
ment of the criminal trial (Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth, & Harrington, 
1984). The tape depicted the testimony of a police officer who had been on 
crowd control duty at a rock music concert. The officer testified that the de-
fendant refused to follow his instructions and then assaulted him. The de-
fendant's testimony was also presented. He claimed that he did not resist 
the officer, that he was behaving in an orderly manner, and that the officer 
abused him verbally with racial slurs. 
Subjects, instructed in the role of jurors, viewed the videotape and then 
answered questions designed to assess their evaluations of witness credi-
bility and to capture some of the inferences they made from the testimony 
on the tape. 
As we had predicted, jurors who were in favor of the death penalty 
(death-qualified) evaluated the evidence in a manner more favorable to the 
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Table 2.1. Mean evaluations of evidence by death-qualified and excludable 
subjects: Study 1a 
Grouph 
Death-
Question qualified Excludable 
Credibility of witnesses 
1. Officer's truthfulness 4.55 3.44 
2. Defendant's truthfulness 3.69 3.05 
3. Relative accuracy of witnesses 4.35 3.25 
Plausibility of facts 
4. Defendant threatened to punch officer 4.15 2.87 
5. Defendant struck officer 4.45 2.37 
6. Officer was cut by bottle 2.81 1.85 
7. Defendant was limping 3.68 3.45 
8. Officer used racial slurs 4.44 3.65 
9. Defendant was derogatory to officer 5.00 4.31 
Inferences from facts 
10. Who initiated the struggle? 4.06 2.35 
11. Was the officer too rough? 4.18 3.10 
12. Defendant's breaking police line justified? 4.00 1.95 
13. Officer antagonistic to defendant? 4.37 3.05 
Attributions about the witnesses 
14. Defendant had previous trouble with police 4.80 3.50 
15. Officer had racial bias 3.12 2.60 



















a The scale ranged from 1 to 6; higher numbers indicate evaluations more favorable to the 
prosecution. 
b Death-qualified n = 19; excludable n = 16. 
c p<.05. 
d p<.01. 
prosecution than did jurors who were opposed to the death penalty (ex-
cludables). We assessed our subjects' judgments of credibility by asking di-
rect questions about the truthfulness of each witness and indirect questions 
about the plausibility or accuracy of six assertions taken directly from the 
witness's testimony. Mean responses of the death-qualified and excludable 
subjects are presented in the top panel of Table 2.1. On the average, death-
qualified subjects responded more favorably to the prosecution than did ex-
cludable subjects on every one of the nine items; for four of the nine items 
this difference was statistically significant. These results strongly support 
our hypothesis that death penalty attitudes influence evaluation of credi-
bility. Although the result is essentially correlational, there is no doubt that 
the attitudes (both the specific penalty attitudes and the related criminal 
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justice attitudes) existed before subjects saw our tape of the policeman and 
the defendant, implying that the attitudes caused the judgments. 
Seven additional questionnaire items, presented at the bottom of Table 
2.1, capture some of the subjects' inferences from the testimony. Again we 
present average ratings for the death-qualified subjects and the excludable 
subjects for each item. The direction of each inference is consistent with our 
hypothesis that death-qualified jurors will be more favorable to the prose-
cution side of the case; five of the seven differences were statistically sig-
nificant. The inference questions ask for subjects' judgments about issues 
that are relevant to their decisions but were not addressed directly in testi-
mony. For example, there were no references in testimony to the defen-
dant's prior experience with the police, but death-qualified subjects were 
more likely than excludable subjects to infer that the defendant had had 
prior trouble with the law. Again we found that attitude toward the death 
penalty predicted decision-relevant reasoning .I 
We also examined the relationship between the subjects' global index of 
attitudes toward capital punishment on Jurow's scale and a summary index 
of their responses on all sixteen of the questionnaire items (credibility and 
inference items). The correlation between the Jurow scale value and the 
evidence evaluation index was+ .60 (statistically significant at the p< .01), 
a remarkably high coefficient in the context of the small or nonexistent cor-
relations between general attitudes and interpretation of specific situations 
obtained in most research. 
Because of the correlational nature of the analysis, and because a person's 
attitude toward the death penalty is correlated with a constellation of other 
attitudes relevant to the criminal justice system, it is not clear exactly which 
attitudes may have served as "premises" for our subjects' inferences about 
credibility and evidence implications. For example, the willingness to make 
inferences from assertions in the testimony may have been conditioned 
simply on their liking and trust for one witness over the other. Perhaps 
an application of a method such as those proposed by Schum and Martin 
(1982), involving multiple ratings of subelements of the evidence and the 
contingencies among them, or the method proposed by Pennington and 
Hastie (1985), in which subjects "think aloud" as they listen to the trial in-
formation, might elucidate some of these fine-grained questions. 
The findings of this first experiment were corroborated in a second mock-
jury experiment in which subjects rated the credibility of six witnesses who 
1 A reviewer suggests that perhaps subjects, anticipating that they would later vote for death, 
reinterpreted the story in order to justify their penalty decision. Thus the inferences subjects 
draw from the facts are not based on the mechanisms we propose, but on subjects' need to 
create consistency with their own expected sentencing behavior in this case. This is a plaus-
ible psychological mechanism in the abstract, but not in this particular case, as the death 
penalty would never be an option in a simple assault and battery case involving only minor 
injuries. In addition, the subjects' death penalty attitudes had been assessed two to six 
weeks earlier, along with a number of other variables, and so were unlikely to be salient to 
the subjects at the time they participated in the study. 
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presented evidence in a two and a half hour reenactment of a murder trial 
(Cowan et al., 1984). Again we divided subjects into two groups, excludables 
(opposed to the death penalty or neutral) versus death-qualified (in favor 
of the death penalty). After viewing the trial and deliberating in twelve-
person mock juries for an hour, these subjects rated the "believability" and 
"helpfulness" of each witness. The mock-jurors' attitudes predicted the aver-
age differences in ratings of all witnesses and these effects were significant 
for each of the prosecution witnesses considered individually. Replicating 
the results from our first study, excludable mock jurors rated the prose-
cution witnesses less believable and less helpful than did death-qualified 
mock jurors. 
Our third hypothesis concerned the relationship between attitudes 
toward capital punishment and a juror's personal threshold for convic-
tion associated with the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard of proof. The 
simplest research method would be to ask subjects to assign a numerical 
value (i.e., a probability estimate) corresponding to the degree of certainty 
that they would have to have to convict a defendant under the beyond-
reasonable-doubt standard. For example, Simon and Mahan (1971) asked 
various groups of potential jurors what subjective probability of guilt they 
would require before voting to convict a criminal defendant. They found 
that the mean probability stated by jury-eligible citizens was .79. Proceed-
ing with the direct approach we would then look for a relationship between 
an individual's rated subjective probabiloity for the threshold and their at-
titudes toward capital punishment. 
We did not pursue the direct approach. First, we doubt that untrained 
subjects can accurately express their decision thresholds as numerical prob-
abilities (cf. Behn & Vaupel, 1982). Second, the standard-of-proof instruc-
tion as presented in many legal trials seems to include more than the mean-
ing expressed in a single numerical probability. Efforts to better define the 
standard of proof with alternate expressions such as "to a moral certainty" 
and historical analyses of the vicissitudes in definitions popular in various 
courts imply that the concept is richer than a single number (e.g., Fletcher, 
1968; Shapiro, 1986). Finally, we already had evidence that jurors' attitudes 
toward capital punishment did not predict their global estimates of the level 
of certainty necessary to justify a verdict of guilty. Estimates were highly 
variable, and both death-qualified and excludable subjects gave mean prob-
ability estimates of about 86 percent (Cowan et al., 1984). Obviously, if there 
are differences, a better method was needed to detect them. 
We started with a consideration of the two possible errors that can be 
made when a juror renders a verdict in a criminal case: The juror can acquit 
a defendant who should have been convicted or the juror can convict a de-
fendant who should have been acquitted. We assume that jurors associate 
a degree of regret or "disutility" with each of these errors. Furthermore, we 
assume that the juror's threshold for conviction is related to the relative re-
gret associated with each type of error. Specifically, we assume that the 
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greater the regret the juror feels for a mistaken conviction relative to a mis-
taken acquittal, the higher will be his or her threshold of conviction. We do 
not assume that our subjects are perfect normative utility maximizers, but 
we assume that the difference in felt regret from erroneous convictions and 
acquittals does correspond to some degree to the threshold for conviction. 
Based on the assumption of a relationship between regret and decision 
criterion, we designed a method to assess the regret associated with the 
two types of errors in a series of hypothetical cases. We used the difference 
between the degrees of regret associated with a lenient error (false acquit-
tal) and harsh error (false conviction) to calculate an index to reflect each 
subject's threshold of conviction. Our prediction was that jurors who favor 
capital punishment would show less regret for wrongful convictions than 
for wrongful acquittals, compared to jurors opposed to capital punishment. 
Experimental subjects were asked to consider sixteen hypothetical situa-
tions and to express the degree of regret they felt in each situation as a num-
ber ranging between 0 and 100. Zero indicated that they felt no regret and 
one hundred indicated that they felt the most regret they could possibly 
feel. The sixteen situations were defined with reference to possible out-
comes of a murder trial. The subjects were asked to imagine that they had 
served on a jury that reached one of four possible verdicts: guilty of first 
degree murder, guilty of second degree murder, guilty of manslaughter, 
or not guilty. Furthermore, they were to imagine that after the trial, evi-
dence was uncovered that demonstrated conclusively that the defendant 
was actually guilty of one of the three crimes or innocent. The sixteen hypo-
thetical case situations were composed by combining each of the four jury 
verdicts with each of the four posttrial evidence outcomes. Thus, four of the 
situations represented correct jury verdicts and twelve represented errors. 
For the analysis we separated subjects (jury-eligible California residents) 
into two groups, death-qualified and excludables, with reference to the 
Witherspoon question (see above). A refined statement of our hypothesis 
would be that when a juror made an error in a harsh direction, by convict-
ing an innocent defendant or convicting a defendant of a crime more severe 
than the crime actually committed, death-qualified subjects would show less 
regret than excludable subjects. In contrast, when the jury's error was in the 
lenient direction, acquitting a guilty defendant or convicting a guilty defen-
dant of a crime less severe than that actually committed, the death-qualified 
jurors would express more regret than the excludable jurors. This is the 
pattern that we observed (see Table 2.2); the difference in regret expressed 
by death-qualified and excludable subjects was statistically significant. 
Death-qualified subjects expressed nearly equal regret for harsh and le-
nient errors, while the excludables expressed more regret than the death-
qualified subjects for harsh errors and less for lenient errors. As we noted 
above, this result is consistent with the constellation of attitudes that are as-
sociated with a procapital punishment position; namely a concern for crime 
control and a sympathy for the prosecution side of legal cases. Conversely, 
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Table 2.2. Mean regret expressed by death-qualified and excludable 
subjects: Study 2" 
Crime defendant actually committed 
1st degree 2nd degree Manslaughter Not 
Verdict of jury murder murder murder guilty 
1st degree murder 
d.q.b 0.67 43.2 54.33 68.86 
Exc.C 7.50 66.07 70.71 90.71 
2nd degree murder 
d.q. 45.00 0.33 49.13 68.20 
Ex c. 27.14 7.14 53.12 85.71 
Manslaughter 
d.q. 54.00 46.33 0.0 69.20 
Ex c. 49.28 44.64 8.2 73.57 
Not guilty 
d.q. 73.73 70.53 60.20 0.0 
Exc. 71.78 61.07 58.21 6.43 
a Higher numbers indicate greater regret. Death-qualified n = 15; excludable n = 14. 
b d.q. =death-qualified. 
c Exc. =excludable. 
the constellation of attitudes associated with opposition to the death penalty 
fits the pattern of regrets expressed by excludable subjects; namely, these 
subjects will have more sympathy for the defendant and more concern for 
due process considerations in the operation of the criminal justice system. 
We believe that our measures of degree of regret have direct implications 
for a juror's decision threshold to convict in criminal cases .. However, we 
must emphasize that the step from regret ratings to a conclusion about sub-
jective standards of proof is based on the assumption that the juror's rea-
soning bears some resemblance to the popular subjective expected utility 
model for decision making (Edwards, 1954). This assumption is common in 
the legal literature (Blackstone, 1769/1962) and it is also compelling intui-
tively. Some researchers (e.g., Nagel, 1979) have been willing to accept this 
assumption in its strongest form and calculate absolute numerical values 
for the probability threshold to convict based on jurors' rated "disutilities." 
We believe that our data shows that death-qualified jurors and excludables 
differ in the relative level of their thresholds for conviction, but we stop 
short of an exact numerical derivation. 
Summary of research on juror's predeliberation decisions 
The three studies we have summarized help us understand links in the chain 
of mediating factors that connect the constellation of attitudes associated 
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with a person's attitude toward the death penalty and the decision concern-
ing guilt or innocence in a criminal trial. Essentially, we have supported 
our hypotheses that the jurors' attitudes influence three components of the 
larger decision process: evaluation of witness credibility, inferences that go 
beyond the given evidence, and the value of the juror's personal standard-
of-proof threshold for conviction. This research illustrates a productive ap-
proach to the study of individual differences in juror decision making. We 
started with the finding that there was a consistent and pervasive relation-
ship between jurors' attitudes toward the death penalty and their propen-
sities to acquit or convict in criminal trials. Second, following Pennington 
and Hastie (1981), we abstracted seven components of a generic model of 
the juror decision process that we felt were likely to mediate the attitude-
decision relationship: evaluation of witness credibility, inferences from the 
evidence, and setting a subjective standard of proof. We then conducted 
a series of experiments to evaluate the impact, or correlation, of attitudes 
toward the death penalty on verdict decisions. The key to our approach is 
the intermediate step in which we attempted to spell out how global atti-
tudes might affect verdicts in particular cases. 
Individual differences in juror behavior in deliberation 
As we noted above, we disagree with Kalven and Zeisel's generalization 
that in nine out of ten juries the verdict is determined by the distribution 
of initial verdict preferences at the start of deliberation (Kalven & Zeisel, 
1966: p. 488). One reason we believe this generalization may be an exag-
geration stems from the findings of other mock-jury research. Hastie, Pen-
rod, and Pennington (1983) found that in more than 25 percent of their 
mock juries a faction that was initially in the minority at the start of delib-
eration prevailed. Although we know very little about the method Kalven 
and Zeisel used to collect the data on which their conclusion is based (the 
study is referenced in a footnote and no further reports of its methods 
or results are available), it may be that the simple two-choice guilty-or-
innocent verdict allows for less movement, e.g., through compromise. Also 
it is likely that a juror's postdeliberation recollections would be biased to 
suggest that the juror subscribed to the jury's final verdict all along. Sim-
ilar effects have been reported in research on voters' retrospective reports 
of voting in political elections, where voters report that they voted for the 
winner more often than they actually did, and in other studies of "hind-
sight phenomena" (Fischhoff, 1975; Hawkins & Hastie, ,1990). Furthermore, 
even if most final verdicts can be predicted as simple functions of the ini-
tial distribution of the verdict preferences, it still is an important scien-
tific problem to understand the social mechanisms that translate initial pref-
erences into the ultimate verdict. And finally, there are still significant legal 
questions which derive from guarantees of due process. Surely a convicted 
defendant would feel cheated if he or she knew that the guarantee of an 
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impartial, thorough, deliberation process was cut short after the frrst jury 
ballot. 
What sort of behaviors in deliberation would be of significant interest in 
an analysis of individual differences, specifically individual differences in 
juror attitudes? First, and most obviously, we would like to predict what 
contributions are made by jurors to the discussion and deliberation. Atti-
tudes should give us some leverage in predicting what prodeath and anti-
death penalty jurors will say. For example, the constellation of due process 
attitudes associated with the antideath penalty stance implies that these 
jurors would be more likely to speak for the defense side of the case, more 
likely to cite the presumption of innocence and standard-of-proof instruc-
tions, and more critical in their evaluations of credibility of testimony from 
the prosecution side of the case. In contrast, the constellation of attitudes as-
sociated with the prodeath stance leads us to expect that these jurors would 
make more remarks in favor of the prosecution side of the case; should 
evaluate the credibility and implications of testimony from prosecution wit-
nesses as more important and more substantial than statements by defense 
witnesses; and should emphasize crime control factors over due process 
factors, for example by citing the danger of allowing the defendant to re-
turn to the streets unpunished. These predictions are relatively uncontro-
versial and follow directly from the concepts associated with the attitude 
difference we have studied. 
There are other individual differences in behavior which might be asso-
ciated with the attitude individual difference, but which are not associated 
with differences in jurors' backgrounds in a direct fashion. For example, 
there are substantial differences in the amounts of talking done by different 
jurors on the same jury. Typically four jurors out of twelve consume more 
than half of the talking time. Three variables are known to predict the 
amount of talking. One variable, labeled "worldly success" by Hastie, Pen-
rod, and Pennington (1983), comprises social status and education; more 
"successful" jurors talk more than less successful ones. Second, juror gen-
der matters; men talk more than women. It is interesting to note that the 
one-and-one-half to one differential in speaking rates has not changed since 
the 1950s when Kalven and Zeisel conducted their original mock-jury ex-
periments (Strodtbeck & Lipinski, 1988), despite apparent shifts in the con-
ceptions of male and female social roles. Third, occupancy of the foreman's 
role is associated with higher amounts of talking; the foreman talked about 
twice as much as any otber juror. We would also like to be able to predict 
which jurors will be most susceptible to persuasive influence from other 
jurors; who is likely to have a change of mind on the jury? However, the 
search for predictors of the "wavering" and the "stubborn" juror has been 
inconclusive. 
As we anticipated, the primary effects of the death penalty attitude vari-
able on behavior during deliberation appear in our analyses of the content 
of statements made by jurors. Our conclusions are based on a mock-jury 
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Table 2.3. Each mock juror classified by attitude toward the death 
penalty and the side of the case favored by a preponderance of the 
juror's statements in deliberation" 
Statement type 
Juror type Unclearb Proprosecution Prodefense 
Excludable 4 8 18 
Death-qualified 11 91 84 





a X2(2) =6.05, p< .05. 
b "Unclear" means juror made an equal number of proprosecution and prodefense 
statements, or made no statements in deliberation. 
study in which California residents qualified to serve as jurors watched the 
reenactment of a murder trial used in our previous research and then delib-
erated for a minimum of an hour in an attempt to reach a verdict. None of 
the mock juries reached a verdict within the first hour of deliberation, but 
the contents of this deliberation provide an indication of what would occur 
in the first stages of a deliberation that ran to a conclusion. Again, we di-
vided our subjects into excludable and death-qualified jurors and we tab-
ulated the remarks they made during deliberation. First we classified the 
overall set of statements made by each juror by counting the number of 
proprosecution and prodefense statements made by each juror. If a major-
ity of the statements were proprosecution we classified the juror in the pro-
prosecution column of Table 2.3; conversely, if the majority of the state-
ments were prodefense we classified the juror in the prodefense column; 
and if the corpus of statements made by a juror did not clearly support 
either side of the case we listed them in the "unclear" column. Two hundred 
sixteen mock jurors were crossclassified by their status on the attitude vari-
able (excludable versus death-qualified) and by the balance of statements 
during deliberation (proprosecution, prodefense, unclear). A significant as-
sociation was observed between these two variables, indicating that exclud-
able jurors tended to favor the defense side of the case in discussion to a 
greater extent than did death-qualified jurors. 
We also reviewed the corpus of statements made by each juror with ref-
erence to the number of remarks they made in favor of a guilty verdict ver-
sus a not guilty verdict, and again produced a two-way table with juror atti-
tudes (excludable versus death-qualified) and verdict favored (guilty, not 
guilty, unclear) as the two factors defining the table. Again, a significant re-
lationship was observed between the two variables such that excludable 
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jurors were more likely to speak for a not guilty verdict than were death-
qualified jurors. 
Conclusion 
Most of the published writing on the effects of individual differences on 
juror's verdicts consists either of overoptimistic claims that various person-
ality or background variables are reliable indicators of a proprosecution or 
prodefense juror, or of gloomy criticisms of these claims, typically ending 
with the equally simplistic claim that the evidence determines the verdict 
and that individual differences do not. A review of the relevant research in-
dicates that the usual hoary or trendy stereotypes are not very useful (race, 
class, gender, occupation, and nationality on the hoary side; power speech, 
color preferences, locus of control, and dress on the trendy side; author-
itarianism somewhere between). But we also know that juries are rarely 
unanimous on the first ballot, and thus, because the evidence presented is 
the same for all the jurors, individual differences must make a difference. 
The evidence presented is the same, but the evidence perceived by the 
jurors is not. 
Some of these influential individual differences may be accidental, as 
when a juror suddenly remembers that she forgot to pay the mortgage bill 
and misses a few minutes of crucial testimony. This sort of error may often 
be corrected in deliberation. Others may be understandable in retrospect, 
but unforeseeable in advance, as when the victim turns out to be the spit-
ting image of the juror's deceitful Uncle Louie. Many may be attitudes that 
only become influential in relation to very specilic case facts, but may be 
potentially discoverable through an extensive voir dire. 
Death penalty attitudes are more general, yet they still provide some 
predictive power. Thus they allowed us a laboratory to explore how a gen-
eral attitude might affect a person's interpretation of a body of evidence, 
and his or her response to it. We have argued that the process may in-
volve an accumulation of many slight differences - in perceptions of the 
plausibility of witnesses, in the availability of different scripts or stories 
for the crime, in the unarticulated sense of how much doubt is reasonable 
doubt. Sometimes the accumulation of these tendencies will be sufficient 
to move a juror across the line from one verdict to another, sometimes not. 
There are undoubtedly other ways in which general attitudes can affect 
jurors' decisions about evidence, and there are probably other attitudes that 
predict verdicts in certain domains of cases. The kitchen-sink approach of 
tacking a sheaf of questionnaire measures onto a jury study in case some-
thing turns out significant is likely to continue to produce discouraging 
results. More carefully crafted studies of specific intermediate processes 
may prove more fruitful, both for understanding verdicts and for under-
standing attitudes. 
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